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I. INTRODUCTION 
 When April 20, 2011, arrived, several national news stations 
recognized the date as the anniversary of the world’s most devastating 
man-made disaster in history. Just one year earlier, every news1 station in 
the country—and many European news stations—descended onto the 
Louisiana coast for the purpose of discussing the explosion aboard BP’s 
Deepwater Horizon’s oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The Deepwater 
Horizon was less than fifty miles away from the coast line, but the 
explosion shown brighter than fireworks in a midnight sky. 
 If any Louisiana citizen wanted to have their fifteen minutes of 
fame, all they had to do was drive to Venice, Louisiana, and select any 
one of the news reporters sitting or standing on the beach. Hotel rooms 
were sold out. The number of men and women dressed in neon orange 
                                                 
† Prentice L. White is an Assistant Professor of Law at Southern University Law Center (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana), and is a former New Orleans prosecutor.  He is currently a member of the 
Louisiana Appellate Project, which is a state agency that handles criminal appeals for indigent 
defendants in Louisiana and he is part of the CJA Panel of contract attorneys for the Middle and 
Western Districts of Louisiana. 
1. See Damien Cave, In Campaign, That Gulf Spill Covers Nation, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, 
at A1; see also Alessandra Stanley, So Sayeth the Anchorman, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at C1. 
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and draping the Louisiana coastline with booms2 resembled an AT&T 
commercial showing how much coverage the AT&T mobile phones have 
in the United States. The Gulf of Mexico waters had turned black from 
the hundreds of thousands of gallons of crude spewing into the gulf.3 
Marine life could be seen trying to avoid the oil, but to no avail. Cable 
news stations continuously monitored the live feed of the blow-out 
valve,4 and reporters interviewed Plaquemine Parish President Billy 
Nungesser more times5 than they interviewed President Barak Obama 
during the 2008 Presidential Elections. 
 In fact, President Obama declared it to be the worst environmental 
disaster in the United States history.6 President Obama later ordered 
Interior Secretary Ken Salazar to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
blowout valve and to report, within a thirty-day period, “what, if any, 
additional precautions and technologies should be required to improve 
the safety of oil and gas exploration and productions operations on the 
outer continental shelf.”7 Generally speaking, it could have been much 
worse had it not been for BP’s unusually deep pockets,8 and its ability to 
fully compensate individuals injured from the oil spill.9 While BP was 
able to mitigate some of the costs, this disaster will impact gulf residents 
for years to come. This section will introduce these impacts by sharing 
three unique stories. It will then discuss the social costs attributed to a 
disaster of this magnitude. Finally, this section calls for action from 
Louisiana’s legislature to create a deterrent to promote responsible 
corporate practice and to protect residents from a known danger. 
                                                 
2. See Campbell Robertson, Efforts to Repel Gulf Spill Are Described as Chaotic, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 2010, at A1. 
3. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, as enacted, imposes strict liability for vessel spills upon the 
“owner” and “operator” of the discharging vessel, but not the cargo owner. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702 
(2008). 
4. Shaila Dewan, In First Success, A Tube Captures Some Leaking Oil, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 
2010, at A1. 
5. Campbell Robertson & Elisabeth Rosenthal, Officials Voice Anger Touring Shores Fouled 
by Slicks and Tar Balls, N. Y. TIMES, May 21, 2010. 
6. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP 
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT 173 (2011) (quoting President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on 
the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill)). 
7. Jonathan C. Augustine, A National Model for Disaster Recovery: Growing Green Jobs in the 
Age of Energy Efficiency, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 179, 193 (2012) (quoting Hornbeck Offshore 
Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (E. D. La. 2010)). 
8. Jad Mouawad, et al., For BP, A Toll Likely to Extend Beyond the Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, June 
15, 2010, at B1. 
9. See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill 
Catastrophes: The Need for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717 (2011). 
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A. The Human Costs 
 A year after this horrible event, all that could be found on this once 
vibrant beach area were three lonely people. Standing inches away from 
the water stood a middle-aged man wearing a white T-shirt, a pair of blue 
jeans and knee-high white rubber boots. This man, whom we shall refer 
to as Jim, had been a Louisiana shrimper since he was thirteen.  Jim had 
later started his own fishing10 business after his father was diagnosed 
with cancer. Jim’s family had been fishing and catching shrimp along the 
Louisiana coasts for over three generations.11 Before, the BP Oil Spill, 
Jim was able to accumulate a yearly salary of approximately $35,000, 
but once the State of Louisiana12 prohibited him and other shrimpers 
from fishing in the waters because of the oil spill, Jim’s income 
plummeted to less than $700 a month for both May and June of 2010. 
Jim joined the crew13 of clean-up14 workers BP hired to clean15 the 
shoreline, but the income he received was barely16 enough to cover his 
family’s basic living expenses—not including the mortgage on his 
shrimp boat. 
 In July 2010, Jim defaulted on the boat mortgage. He later used 
some of his savings to pay his monthly expenses and forfeited his eldest 
son’s chance of going to college that fall. The money he received from 
BP was less than what he expected. Considering that his business was 
primarily in cash revenues,17 it was difficult for him to prove to the BP 
                                                 
10. See An Economy on Pause in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2010 (demonstrating 
economic activities prevalent in the gulf prior to the spill). 
11. See Katy Muldoon, Northwesterners Rush to Help Mitigate the Environment Disaster 
Unfolding in the Gulf, THE OREGONIAN, May 22, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/in
dex.ssf/2010/05/northwesterners_rush_to_help_m.html. 
12. In Hurton Portland Cement Co. v. Detriot, 362 U. S. 440 (1960), the United States 
Supreme Court upheld a local air pollution ordinance which regulated emissions from vessels on 
navigable waters. The Supreme Court also noted that the local ordinance was designed to free from 
pollution the very air that people breathe clearly and such legislation was within the realm of the 
state’s police power. 
13. John LeLand, Cleanup Hiring Feeds Frustration in Fishing Town, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2010, at A12. 
14. Jad Mouawad & John Schwartz, Rising Cleanup Costs and Numerous Lawsuits Rattle BP’s 
Investors, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/us/02liability.html?_r=0. 
15. See NIEHS Activities Related to the Gulf Oil Spill: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010) (Statement of Aubrey Keith 
Miller, M.D., MPH Senior Medical advisor, National Institute of Environmental Health Services, 
National Institutes of Health, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services), [hereinafter Health 
Effects] (stating that workers involved in cleanup have reported the highest levels of exposure and 
the most acute symptoms, when compared to subjects exposed in different ways). 
16. See John LeLand, supra note 13. 
17. See Fay Pappas, Note, Gulf Coast Blowout: How the BP Oil Spill is Corroding 
Communities And What Attorney’s & Policymakers Must Do to Stop It, 22 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 229 (2011) (classifying these cash-based businesses as Renewable Resource Communities 
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claims representatives that he earned much more than what he could 
prove on his tax returns and his other receipts. Kenneth Feinberg and his 
team gave Jim a difficult time in assessing his claim for damages.18 Jim’s 
shrimp boat was later repossessed. His wife got a waitressing job in 
Jefferson Parish to help the family. Disappointing his children and 
destroying his family’s fishing heritage made Jim suicidal and dependent 
on various psychiatric19 medications. When the oil spill happened and 
BP was experiencing severe problems with cutting off the blowout valve, 
the fear among Jim and his fellow fishermen was staggering.20 
 About twenty feet south of where Jim was sat Margaret, a co-owner 
of a twenty-unit hotel in Venice, Louisiana, who was sitting on the sand, 
letting the wind blow through her partially gray hair. Next to her was 
Margaret’s husband, Robert, of thirty years. During the week of the 
explosion, Robert and Margaret had been painting the rooms of the hotel 
in anticipation of the sport fishermen and college students on spring 
break who normally visit the gulf in the late spring. Instead of 
vacationers, Margaret and Robert welcomed hundreds of national and 
international journalists, as well as a host of reporters from cable news 
networks to cover the BP Oil Spill. They even leased a room or two to 
several BP executives who came to Louisiana to establish BP’s presence 
for public relations purposes. 
 What they expected to be a mediocre weekend actually tripled their 
accounts receivable.  In fact, they received more during the first three 
weeks of the oil spill than the first six months of last year’s profit 
margin. Suddenly, the oil started to wash ashore in May 2010, and began 
invading Louisiana’s beaches and precious marshlands. The reporters 
were fearful of what diseases or illnesses they might contract being so 
close to the contaminated waters. BP’s claims adjusters were checking 
out and Margaret’s regular patrons were canceling their vacation plans to 
Louisiana. The short-term profit did not make up for the huge losses that 
                                                                                                             
because these Gulf Coast communities have very little occupational variety outside of commercial 
fishing other than the businesses directly supported by the fishing industry; such as processing plants 
and local restaurants). 
18. See Terry Carter, Master of Disasters: Is Ken Feinberg Changing the Course of Mass Tort 
Resolution?, ABA JOURNAL, Jan. 1, 2011 (stating that “[t]he BP oil spill looks to be Feinberg’s most 
problematic challenge to date. It is difficult to assay the future of the Gulf’s health, and thus the 
livelihoods of tens or hundreds of thousands, and resulting ripple effects elsewhere”—especially the 
cash-only economy that predominates the small-scale commercial fishing industry). 
19. See Health Effects, supra note 15(arguing that clean-up workers reported higher levels of 
generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depressive symptoms). 
20. See Pappas, supra note 17, at 245 (discussing Dr. Arwen Podesta, a psychiatrist at Tulane 
University in New Orleans, who described the behavior of these Louisiana fisherman following 
Hurricane Katrina and the BP Oil Spill as “teetering on the edge of wellness” and “decompensating 
into severe depression and resurgence of PTSD” from Katrina). 
2013] We Want Our Lives Back Too 105 
came later. Pretty soon, Margaret and Robert had exhausted their 
unprecedented profits. Desperate for money to take care of his wife, 
Robert joined one of the cleanup crews,21 hoping to accelerate22 the 
progress of getting the beaches clean and welcoming vacationers back to 
Louisiana, but the cleanup crews faced their own challenges. 
 Many residents described the smell of crude oil in the Gulf as 
overpowering.23 Some feared that the parish’s drinking water would also 
be compromised. In fact, Robert had been working for the cleanup crew 
for only three weeks, before he developed a respiratory24 infection in his 
lungs from inhaling the fumes from the crude oil washing ashore the 
Louisiana beaches. Soon, Margaret found herself abandoning their hotel 
to care for her ailing husband. Watching the man who once seemed 
unstoppable turn into someone who could not walk from the kitchen to 
the bedroom without becoming exhausted was heartbreaking. The couple 
invested so much in their hotel that if something happened to her 
husband, Margaret would be bankrupt in less than five years. Margaret 
regularly came to the beach to pray because she feared25 her entire 
financial life was coming to an end and she wanted to remember why she 
and her husband chose Venice, Louisiana, to start their business—the 
beautiful sunsets and the Gulf of Mexico’s hypnotizing waters. 
 Walking past Margaret was a young woman in her twenties who 
was sobbing uncontrollably. She was wearing a faded men’s college 
sweatshirt and a pair of pajama pants. Standing in the spring sunshine, 
anyone could see the dazzling diamond engagement ring on her left 
hand. This young woman’s sadness did not stem from a crumbling 
business or an irreparable career, instead, Jenny was mourning the loss of 
her fiancé who was killed aboard the Deepwater Horizon in April 2010. 
They were scheduled to be married two months after the explosion. But 
                                                 
21. See Muldoon, supra note 11. 
22. See Press Release, Gulf Coast Senators Introduce Resolution Urging BP to Use Local 
Products and Services in Oil Spill Activities, Government Press Releases (July 15, 2010) 
[hereinafter GULF COAST SENATORS] (stating that BP would be wise to use the fishermen, hoteliers, 
restaurateurs, and other local residents to assist in the taking the edge off the economic disaster this 
spill has caused to this region). 
23. See Heath Effects, supra note 15 (quoting Dr. Miller’s testimony wherein he stated that 
“the oil nearest the source of a spill contains higher levels of some volatile and more toxics 
components, such as benzene, toluene, and xylene”). 
24. Id. 
25. See Pappas, supra note 17, at 244 (indicating that Dr. Irwin Redlender, the President and 
Center Director of the Children’s Health Fund, conducted a survey of 1200 Gulf Coast residents in 
Louisiana and Mississippi, and discovered that there existed “a persistent and overwhelming level of 
anxiety among families living near the coast that is driven by both medical symptoms in their 
children as well as substantial level of psychological stress”) (citing Debbie Elliot & Marisa 
Penaloza, BP Spill Psychological Scars Similar to Exxon Valdez, Nat. Pub. Radio (Dec. 1, 2010) 
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/01/131694848/bp-spill-psychological-scars-similar-to-exxon-valdez). 
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now, all Jenny has to remember her fiancé are pictures, a few of his 
college sport shirts, and a host of memories she wakes up to every 
morning. 
B. The Social Costs 
 Jim, Margaret, and Jenny represent three categories of gulf coast 
residents whose lives were forever changed by the BP Oil Spill. Five 
months after the spill, BP capped its massive gusher at the bottom of the 
Gulf, but the Louisiana coastline was still saturated from the hundreds of 
thousands of gallons of crude oil from the oil rig that was positioned 
approximately forty-one miles off the Louisiana coast.26 Marine animals 
were either contaminated or killed by the brown-colored sludge that 
ascended 5,000 miles from the floor of the Gulf of Mexico. Men and 
women have seen their life savings evaporate. Students were forced to 
withdraw from college and return home to help their parents and 
grandparents pay their mortgages/rent and utilities. Some have even 
taken their lives due to the enormous amount of stress and anxiety from 
this horrible accident. The stories of these three people were not included 
for dramatic effect, but were instead included in an effort to give a full 
appreciation27 of the human cost of the BP oil spill, so the reader can 
fully appreciate of the realities of what the BP Oil Spill had done to the 
lives of Louisiana’s residents, its wildlife, and its coastline.28 
 Now, in the aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, it is incumbent on the 
State of Louisiana to protect its citizenry by incorporating policies to 
ensure that its residents will not have to experience such a hardship and 
will have the financial resources to recover from future disasters.29 
Simply because the oil is not floating on the surface of the water does not 
mean that the threat is over or that the harm has been minimized.30 Over 
                                                 
26. See Jay Reeves, America Moves On From Spill: Coast Feels Abandoned, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/09/america-moves-on-from-
spi_n_756928.html. 
27. Id. (declaring that there is nothing more unsettling about the worst man-made disaster in U. 
S. history than the nation’s short attention span and their desire to hear something different or to talk 
about the next big thing). 
28. See Krissah Thompson, As Gulf Cleanup Continues, BP Will Also Struggle to Clean Up Its 
Brand, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/18/AR2010081803063.html?hpid=topnews (writing that David Kotok, 
chief investment officer for Cumberland Advisors, says that BP will pay out at least $50 billion in 
fines, lawsuits, and settlements related to the oil spill, but has little to no idea how BP would initiate 
a brand comeback after this type of disaster). 
29. Melinda Deslatte, Lawmakers Rant Futilely about Oil Spill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20, 
2010, http://www.pddnet.com/news/2010/06/analysis-lawmakers-rant-futilely-about-oil-spill?qt-
most_popular=0. 
30. See Reeves, supra note 26. 
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the last two years since the BP Oil Spill, many Louisiana residents have 
entered into a heightened panic during the hurricane seasons because of 
the possibility that oil sediments from the spill could be moved onto 
Louisiana’s wetlands and beaches.31 
 For this reason, policies that promote a culture of corporate 
responsibility would be instrumental in guarding the public against high 
levels of mental stress, unemployment, and loss of life that spread 
profusely in southeast Louisiana in the years following the BP explosion. 
Louisiana lawmakers must promote policies and legislation that will not 
only provide additional avenues of recovery for those injured by 
corporate carelessness, but also broadcast to other companies (both 
present and future) that corporate responsibility32 will forever be at the 
forefront of all commercial activity within Louisiana’s borders. 
Whatever policies, statutes, regulations, or bills are introduced to shield 
Louisiana from any future threats, it must include a human rights due 
diligence component. After all, what happened on April 20, 2010, was 
definitely a human rights violation because BP overlooked,33 
disregarded, and/or neglected to consider the impact its business 
decisions would have on the economy, the wildlife, the coastline, and the 
mental stability of Gulf Coast residents—especially the residents of the 
State of Louisiana.34 Many of the Gulf Coast communities have their 
livelihoods inextricably linked to the environment. Communities in 
southwest Louisiana face particularly serious challenges with 
overcoming the effects of the oil spill due to the persistent language and 
cultural barriers between the Cajun descendants and Vietnamese refugees 
who have settled in the area.35 
                                                 
31. See Amy Wold, Isaac’s Impact on BP Oil Unknown, THE ADVOCATE, Sept.1, 2012, 
http://theadvocate.com/home/3777018-125/isaacs-impact-on-bp-oil (discussing the apprehension 
many state administrators felt regarding the possibility of Hurricane Isaac stirring up the more than 
one million barrels of oil buried in the sediments of the Gulf of Mexico with its 100 mile-per-hour 
winds). 
32. See Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971), (indicating that the 
storage of dangerous and highly poisonous gas by the defendant corporation was an activity which, 
even when conducted with the greatest of care and prudence, could still cause damage to others in 
the neighborhood based upon the possible consequence that gas could escape and cause harm). 
33. See Thompson, supra note 28 (David Kotok, the chief investment officer for Cumberland 
advisors notes that there is a “human and psychological factor that is impossible to measure” and 
“‘BP’ becomes the identification of the perpetrator of the trauma and it’s a long-term relationship 
damaged”). 
34. David Segal, Should BP’s Money Go Where the Oil Didn’t?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at 
BU1.  
35. See Mireya Navarro, Spill Takes Toll on Gulf Workers’ Psyches, N. Y. TIMES, June 16, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/us/17human.html?scp=3&sq=impact%20of%C20BP%C
20oil%C20spill%C20on%20fisherman&st=cse. 
108 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 3:101 
C. The Call for Change 
 This Article attempts to introduce an idea for Louisiana legislators 
to consider as a proactive measure in protecting Louisiana citizens from 
the negligent and reckless behavior of corporations that have decided to 
engage in commercial activity within the state. This Article suggests that 
Louisiana should expand the scope of its absolute36 liability statute 
(Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code) to address some of the 
problems our citizens have experienced while enduring the BP Oil Spill 
debacle in the spring of 2010. 
The theory underlying the doctrine of absolute liability is that while 
abnormally dangerous activities may not be illegal and may even 
have beneficial results, these activities should pay their own way. 
Thus, even though an individual [or a juridical person] who is en-
gaged in an activity such as blasting or flying an airplane cannot 
with utmost care and skill prevent some accidents, he should[,] nev-
ertheless, be responsible to those that are injured as a result of his 
activities. Absolute liability then, is the price to be paid for the priv-
ilege of engaging in abnormally hazardous activities.37 
 This Article will address the need for the state legislature to make a 
drastic response by reviewing cases around the country where 
corporations have been held civilly liable for the consequences that 
resulted from their negligent acts. This Article will also discuss why 
expanding the state’s absolute liability statute is appropriate—both 
socially and fiscally. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE—WHY IS IT NOT FIRST AND 
FOREMOST IN THE CORPORATE MAKEUP OF OUR SOCIETY? 
 Louisiana is no stranger to natural and man-made disasters.38 In 
addition to battling a number of natural disasters such as Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, Louisiana citizens have had to combat man-made 
                                                 
36. See W. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 505-16, 974-75 
(5th ed. 1984) (defining absolute liability based on the presumption that certain activity is extra-
hazardous; therefore, the participant in this hazardous activity is saddled with the burden of being 
liable for any damage he causes). 
37. Major Fred K. Morrison, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 MIL. L. 
REV. 53, 55 (1973). 
38. See generally J. Steven Picou, When The Solution Becomes the Problem: The Impacts of 
Adversarial Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 68, 70-71 
(2009) (distinguishing technological disasters from natural disasters through association with 
anthropogenic causes such as careless, irresponsible, or reckless behavior. “Most often such 
behavior results from a technological system failure or the lack of organizational vigilance in the 
operation and management of toxic production, transportation, and containment systems. 
Technological disasters occur when systems thought to be under human control fail, resulting in the 
toxic contamination of the biophysical environment”). 
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environmental disasters caused by businesses. Because Louisiana 
citizens have historically been responsible for a disproportionate amount 
of cost as a result of these man-made disasters, Louisiana law should 
incorporate a mechanism to protect the financial interests of its state’s 
citizens. The following cases illustrate how corporations have caused 
disastrous consequences from their abuse of power in Louisiana. 
 In Davis v. Insurance Co. of North America,39 a temporary worker 
for Independent Tank Cleaning Services (Independent) was severely 
injured while cleaning a tanker that was delivered to Independent by 
Schneider National Bulk Carriers, Inc., (Schneider).40 Both Independent 
and Schneider claimed no accountability for the plaintiff’s injuries. 
Specifically, both Independent and Schneider (defendants) alleged that 
Davis (plaintiff) caused his own injuries (victim’s fault) by using a leaf 
blower to extract the flammable fumes from the tanker. On the other 
hand, Davis argued that Schneider was at fault for failing to take 
reasonable measures to protect Davis from the risk of harm.41 Davis’s 
workers’ compensation carrier intervened in the lawsuit, seeking 
reimbursement from one, or both, of the defendants. 
 Ultimately, the district court released both defendants from liability 
by granting their summary judgment motions. The plaintiff attempted to 
hold Schneider accountable under Louisiana’s absolute liability statute, 
which is found in Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code.42 The plaintiff 
alleged that because Schneider engaged in ultra-hazardous43 activity, it 
should be held accountable for any, and all, injuries he sustained.44  The 
First Circuit disagreed, concluding that the activity the plaintiff was 
involved in at the time of his injuries was not ultrahazardous—even 
though the storage of toxic gases was listed as an example of 
ultrahazardous activity.45 The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither 
defendant engaged in ultrahazardous activity because Independent 
cleaned the tanks in question on a routine basis, and a professional 
cleaning company had cleaned the tanks prior to Independent. 
                                                 
39. See Davis v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 94-0698 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95); 652 So. 2d 531. 
40. Id. at 534. 
41. Id. at 535. 
42. Under the Louisiana statute establishing limitations on use of property, strict liability is 
limited to ultra-hazardous activities of pile driving and blasting with explosives, and otherwise 
liability requires a showing of knowledge and negligence. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (2012); 
see also TS & C Invs., LLC v. BEUSA Energy, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 370, 380 (W. D. La. 2009). 
43. See Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. 1982). 
44. See Davis, 652 So. 2d at 535. 
45. For an activity to be labeled “ultra-hazardous” it must be one that can cause injury to 
others, even when conducted with the greatest prudence and care. See Updike v. Browning-Ferris, 
Inc., 808 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. La. 1992). 
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 In TS & C Investments v. BEUSA Energy, Inc.,46 TS & C 
Investments (plaintiffs), representing themselves and the other residents 
in Iberville Parish, filed a punitive class action lawsuit complaint against 
BEUSA Energy (defendant), alleging damages for loss of business, loss 
of economic opportunity, nuisance, and mental anguish resulting from an 
oil well blowout that closed Interstate 10.47 The plaintiffs’ cause of 
action against the defendant rested totally on economic damages and did 
not involve any physical or property damages, which are necessary under 
Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Using the Erie48 doctrine 
regarding a plaintiff’s claim for purely economic damages under Article 
667, the federal district court noted that Louisiana jurisprudence 
previously concluded that a party may not recover for economic loss not 
associated with physical damage or proprietary damage.49 
 Examples of corporate mismanagement and abuse are endless. With 
more and more corporations trying to obtain optimum wealth and 
monopoly status against their competitors, it is not surprising that the 
general public is regularly overlooked. The argument was that the United 
States, with its enormous amount of activity, armed forces, space 
exploration, Atomic Energy Commission, crime-fighting activities, and 
endless construction projects, should be immune from absolute 
liability.50 However, to shield the federal government from this risk 
would emasculate the purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and force 
the public to bear this horrendous burden.51 
 The overwhelming interest of most domestic corporations is to 
increase their profit margin and to decrease their tax liability. Simply 
canvassing recent national newspapers and cable news stations can tell 
you how most Americans feel about today’s corporate climate. From the 
Wall Street debacle to the near congressional deadlock that took place 
during the debt-ceiling debate in the summer of 2011; the public’s 
distrust52 of government is ever-growing53 and could jeopardize this 
                                                 
46. See TS & C Invs., 637 F. Supp. 2d at 370. 
47. Id. 
48. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that a federal court 
interpreting a state law must look to the final decisions of that state’s highest court to determine the 
merits of the plaintiff’s complaint); see also TS & C Invs., 637 F. Supp. 2d at 374. 
49. See TS & C Invs., 637 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
50. The discretionary function exception was the basis for denying liability to the federal 
government for the Texas City Disaster in the United States case of Dalehite v. United States, 346 
U.S. 15, 57-9 (1953). 
51. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15. 
52. See Thompson, supra note 28. 
53. See Matthew Cardinale, Gulf Spill Galvanizes Activist Community, INTER PRESS SERVICE 
(June 30, 2010), http://ipsnorthamerica.net/news.php?idnews=3167. 
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nation’s economic recovery unless corporations make basic human rights 
a priority.54 
 If these corporate citizens fail to prioritize human rights in their 
agenda, then perhaps corporate criminal55 liability may become an option 
for deterrence.56 Some scholars caution against an overuse of the penal 
code to punish corporate offenders because prosecuting corporations can 
cause: (1) employees to lose a source of income; (2) shareholders and 
consumers to carry the burden of huge fines in the form of lower 
dividends and higher prices; (3) basic business practices to be confused 
with criminal activity; and (4) individual actors (corporate CEOs) to be 
shielded from personal57 responsibility or walking away from criminal 
prosecution under the cloak of corporate impunity.58 
 David Kotok, the Chief Investment Officer for Cumberland 
Advisors, stated that BP, following the April 2010 disaster, would have 
to do something more than just fix the damage from the oil spill. BP 
would have to do something positive, something huge, and it would have 
to do it for a rather long time before the public would be willing to 
forgive.59 Therefore, inserting a human rights due diligence component 
into Louisiana’s corporate statutes and business culture is essential. 
 Professor John Ruggie, a business professor at the Harvard 
University Kennedy School of Business and the United Nations Special 
Representative on Business and Human Rights (SRSG), coined the term 
human rights due diligence to describe what companies should do to 
meet their responsibility, to respect human rights, and to demonstrate to 
others that they do.60 
                                                 
54. Id. 
55. See Faisal A. Shuja, Federal Criminal Issues Presented by the British Petroleum Oil Spill, 
9 LOY. MAR. L. J. 115 (2011) (stating that the Department of Justice will bring criminal charges 
against BP for endangering the marine ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico). 
56. See Don Stuart, Punishing Corporate Criminals With Restraint, 6 CRIM. L. F. 219, 240 
(1995) (indicating that “most state corporate criminal liability is based on legislative enactment of 
the relevant provisions of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code . . . [which] provides for 
corporate liability respecting three forms of wrongful conduct: (1) regulatory offenses; (2) failures to 
perform specific duties imposed by law, and (3) penal law violations”). 
57. See EDWIN HARDIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949). 
58. See Morrison, supra note 37, at 60 (stating that engaging in an abnormally dangerous 
activity is not actually wrongful until an injury results, which ultimately makes the activity 
sufficiently wrongful and the actor understandably liable). 
59. See Thompson, supra note 28. 
60. See John Sherman, Whose Risk Is It? Viewing Corporate Catastrophe Through a Human 
Rights Lens, 6 No. 4 In-HOUSE PERSP. 9 (2010) (citing John Ruggie, Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (9 April 2010), available at 
www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf [hereinafter Protect, Respect and Remedy]). 
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 BP’s history61 of committing felony violations62 in its safety 
procedures, storage, extraction, and manufacturing of its oil products 
provides sufficient evidence for the Department of Justice to issue a 
criminal indictment63 for the Gulf Oil Spill.64 The purpose of imposing 
criminal penalties against corporate giants like BP is to protect the 
environment (including wildlife) and to insure the purity65 of the nation’s 
waters. Congress specifically passed the Clean Water Act,66 the 
Endangered Species Act,67 the Marine Mammal Protection Act,68 and the 
Oil Pollution69 Act to impose criminal liability and protect the 
environment.70 
III. LOUISIANA’S PROPOSED RESPONSE TO THE OIL SPILL  
 Regardless of whether corporations decide to change their agenda or 
not, the state of Louisiana must set in motion progressive and bold ideas 
to protect its citizenry and close off any potential opportunities for other 
commercial juggernauts, like BP, to come upon its shores and 
contaminate its wildlife and its unique way of life. With this in mind, this 
Author proposes that our state legislators consider amending Article 667 
of the Louisiana Civil Code to include oil drilling as a third category of 
ultrahazardous activity that could expose a landowner, lessee, lessor, or 
corporation to damages. In fact, deepwater drilling provides a timely case 
study of how to structure liability for an economic activity that can cause 
catastrophic loss. The activity of deepwater drilling can exceed the 
injurer’s financial resources, and without imposing some form of 
liability, the tort liability system can be diluted from creating incentives 
for safety71 and it may limit compensation for the injured.72 
                                                 
61. See Joe Nocera, BP Ignored the Omens of Disasters, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at B1. 
62. See John Collins Rudolf, BP Station Owners Face Long Road to Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2010, at B1. 
63. See generally United States v. BP Products N. Am., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 670 (S. D. 
Tex. 2009). 
64. See Shuja, supra note 55, at 117-18. 
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006). 
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. 
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1361. 
69. COMM. ON ENV’T AND PUB. WORKS, S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723 (declaring that the two-fold mission of the OPA was to: (1) coordinate 
existing state and federal law addressing the problem of oil pollution; and (2) establish a 
comprehensive liability scheme that “internalized” the costs of clean-up and compensation within 
the oil industry). 
70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761. 
71. See Marva Jo Wyatt, Financing the Clean-Up: Cargo Owner Liability for Vessel Spills, 7 
U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 353 (1995) (stating that without a threat of liability, there exist no real incentives 
for the oil industry to prevent spills). 
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 Louisiana Civil Code Article 667 provides the following: 
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, 
still he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neigh-
bor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of 
any damage to him.  However, if the work he makes on his estate 
deprives his neighbor of enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is 
answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in 
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his works 
would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by 
the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such 
reasonable care.  Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court 
from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur73 in an ap-
propriate case.  Nonetheless, the proprietor is answerable for dam-
ages without regard to his knowledge or his exercise of reasonable 
care, if the damage is caused by an ultrahazardous activity.  An ul-
trahazardous activity as used in this Article is strictly limited to pile 
driving or blasting with explosives.74  
 It is obvious that the legislature intended to hold the tortious 
neighbor accountable for his fellow neighbor’s injuries under either 
negligence (i.e. fault) or under absolute75 liability, which does not 
require a finding of fault. It is unfortunate that the language in Article 
667 limits the description of absolute liability to pile driving and blasting 
with explosives.76 Oil drilling and oil exploration in general are a 
combination of qualifying activities. This Author suggests that this fact 
presents a unique opportunity for the Louisiana legislature to consider77 
amending the list of ultrahazardous activities. 
 Every theory of tort liability from intentional torts to strict liability 
can be found within Article 2315 or the several articles drafted by the 
legislature derived from Article 2315. It is the fountainhead of 
Louisiana’s tort law. However, the legislature nestled the principles of 
products liability and absolute liability under Title 9 section 2800 of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes and Civil Code Article 667, respectively. 
This Author’s proposal to amend Article 667 to address the issues that 
arose during the BP Oil Spill came as a result of reviewing the language 
                                                                                                             
72. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 9, at 1719. 
73. Kenneth Culp Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REV. 751, 791 
(1956) (stating that res ipsa loquitur presumes that, without negligence, there would not have been 
an injury). 
74. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (2012). 
75. See Wyatt, supra note 71, at 371 (stating that “the goal of absolute liability is compensation 
as opposed to punishment”). 
76. Id. 
77. See Raphael Brothers v. Cerophyl Laboratories, 30 So. 2d 116 (La. 1947). 
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in Article 667 and seeing the similarities between pile driving and 
blasting with explosives, the two activities that qualify as ultrahazardous, 
and oil drilling. 
 Several civilian scholars have noted that if ultrahazardous activities 
were to include any land-related activity, the floodgates of litigation 
would be opened, and every conceivable incident that resulted in a 
landowner being harmed from his neighbor’s use of his property would 
be an absolute liability78 situation.79 
 For example, in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Company,80 the family 
of a deceased 18-year-old employee of a Baton Rouge contracting 
company filed a wrongful death81 action against the decedent’s employer 
and the electrical utility company that serviced the power line that 
electrocuted the decedent.82  The decedent’s employer settled with the 
family prior to trial, and the jury found the remaining defendant (the 
electric company) liable for $3 million. The jury also found the 
decedent’s employer liable for a percentage of the harm caused in failing 
to properly supervise the decedent prior to the accident.  The appellate 
court affirmed the finding of liability for the contracting company, but it 
reversed the finding of liability for the electrical utility company.83 The 
appellate court opined that the decedent’s use of a highly dangerous 
method of placing grooves in the newly poured concrete street surface 
was indicative of his negligence. The decedent’s actions constituted 
contributory negligence and barred any recovery he could claim from the 
utility company. 
 Being that Kent was decided before the 1996 amendments to Article 
667 of the Civil Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the 
argument that transmitting electricity84 for public consumption was 
                                                 
78. In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971), the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that a fireman was entitled to receive damages from the defendant corporation 
after he suffered personal injuries from the inhalation of gasses that escaped from the defendant 
chemical corporation. The Langlois court noted that the defendant corporation’s ultrahazardous 
activities were the storage and transportation of a gas known as antimony pentachloride, which 
emanated from a ruptured pipe on the defendant corporation’s premises. 
79. See John C. Anjier, Butler v. Baber: Absolute Liability for Environmental Hazards, 49 LA. 
L. REV. 1139 (1989) (offering a host of scenarios in which a land-owner can hold another landowner 
accountable for harm caused by the other neighbor’s use of his property. “For example, a business 
would be liable for any of its discharges into the water or air that caused harm, even if they were 
reasonable under the circumstances and the business had obtained the required necessary permits 
and authority”). 
80. See Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 493 (La. 1982). 
81. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.5 (2012). 
82. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 563. 
83. Id. at 570. 
84. Electrical companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. See 29 C.J.S. Electricity § 
38 (2013); see also Bosley v. Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 255 A.2d 671 (Vt. 1969). 
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another category of absolute liability, similar to pile-driving, storage of 
toxic gas, crop dusting, and blasting with explosives. The court began its 
analysis with the well-established understanding that absolute liability is 
not contingent on an actor’s substandard conduct. The Louisiana 
Supreme Court made it clear that absolute liability does require evidence 
of damages and causation. 
 Accordingly, the court ruled that liability would not attach to the 
utility company because causation could not be established without a 
showing that the decedent’s electrocution resulted from the utility 
company’s activity of transmitting electricity through the high-powered 
lines directly above the area where he was working. In addition, the court 
could not find any precedence for imposing absolute liability on 
transmitting electricity for public consumption.85 
 Unlike Kent, the damage to Louisiana coastline citizens from the oil 
spill requires the state to take bold and, perhaps, unorthodox measures to 
protect residents and to ensure that Louisiana will do whatever is 
necessary to protect human rights. 
 When this Author initially proposed amending Article 667 to 
include oil drilling activities as a third example of ultra-hazardous 
activities, there were some who sprinkled a healthy dose of skepticism 
over the idea, calling the proposed amendments unnecessary since 
Louisiana’s tort statutes were more than sufficient to address any 
potential harm endured. Some critics even concluded that a property 
article, like Article 667, would not add much assistance to those persons 
harmed by the BP Oil Spill. They further stated that jurists were capable 
of finding an appropriate remedy for those Louisiana citizens injured by 
BP’s recklessness. 
 While Louisiana jurists do not lack skill or analytical talent, there is 
a continuing threat that our courts will not consider Louisiana property86 
laws as addressing this type of issue.  Instead, the courts will begin to 
settle upon alternative theories of liability to address the plaintiff’s 
injuries.87 It is necessary that the legislature intervene to provide 
consistency in the law as well as aggressively recompense the plaintiff 
for his harm for two key reasons—(1) the grand nature of the 2010 BP 
Oil Spill and (2) the similarities between oil drilling and the two 
specified examples of ultra-hazardous activities. 
                                                 
85. See Annotation, Applicability of Rule of Strict Liability to Injury from Electrical Current 
Escaping from Powerline, 82 A.L.R. 3d 218 (1978). 
86. See Wex S. Malone, Work of Appellate Courts-1969-1970: Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 231, 239 
(1971) (stating that Art. 667, being a rule of property, not of tort, did not lend itself well to the 
purpose of deciding which harms and annoyances should be accepted by society without recourse, 
and which enterprises should be made to bear liability for their activities without qualification). 
87. See Morrison, supra note 37, at 66. 
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 First, the 2010 BP Oil Spill was one of the most costly man-made 
disasters in this country’s history. Thousands of miles of Louisiana 
beaches were damaged by crude oil that washed onto its borders.88 
Hundreds of families lost their businesses. Stories of suicides and 
suicidal ideations became the soup of the day. National and international 
news stations were positioned all over the Plaquemine Parish, Louisiana 
and kept a running tab on the amount of oil spewing from the damaged 
blowout valve. BP pointed the finger of accountability at TransOcean89 
and TransOcean turned the focus to Haliburton.90 Haliburton and 
Transocean then retaliated, stating that BP was solely responsible for the 
explosion, which caused the death of eleven oil workers and the spillage 
of over four million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.91 While 
the BP Oil Spill deserves the unyielding attention of our state legislature, 
to suggest that Louisiana’s current tort law is sufficient to address the 
wrongs committed by this multi-billion dollar foreign company is 
appalling and contemptible. 
 Secondly, absolute liability92 is a reasonable avenue of recovery for 
any injured plaintiff who has been temporarily or permanently harmed by 
the drilling operations of an oil company. The oil-drilling process is very 
similar to pile-driving and blasting with explosives. The Louisiana 
legislature93 must make its response swift, direct, and unavoidable. 
Further, absolute liability does not hinge upon the negligent behavior of 
the actor, but instead hinges on the fact that harm was caused.94 
                                                 
88. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 9, at 1744 (stating that the oil spill has led to a 
substantial drop in tourism; even though BP had dedicated a substantial amount of its financial 
resources towards rejuvenating Gulf Coast vacationers to return to Gulf Coast beaches, the fact 
remains that consumer confidence is not compensable under current law). 
89. See Campbell Robertson & Matthew L. Wald, The Tangled Question of Liability, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A20; John M. Broder, Ruling Favors Owner of Rig In Gulf Spill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at B4. 
90. See Barry Meir & Clifford Krauss, Spill Inquiry Again Puts Haliburton Into Spotlight, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, at A20. 
91. Id. 
92. See Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905 (1973) (stating 
that [a]ny activity, which causes damage to a neighbor’s property, obliges the actor to repair the 
damage, even though his actions are prudent by usual standards. It is not the manner in which the 
activity is carried on which is significant; it is the fact that the activity causes damage to a neighbor, 
which is relevant). 
93. See Pappas, supra note 17, at 251 (asserting that some states have encouraged attorneys to 
participate (pro bono) in community-driven mediation programs to between the economically-
injured residents and the harm-causing companies so that litigation would be thwarted and the 
attorneys could receive annual pro bono hours as compensation). 
94. “The doctrine of sic utere tuum ut alienum non laedas requires an owner to use his property 
in such a manner as not to injure another.” Mossy Motors, Inc., v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New 
Orleans, 98-0495 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/99); 753 So. 2d 269, 274 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 
(2012) and Haworth v. L’Hoste, 95-0714 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/30/95); 664 So. 2d 1335, writ denied 
670 So. 2d 1235). 
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Considering the amount of mental, physical, and economic harm 
experienced by Louisiana citizens who have lost loved ones or have lost 
their family’s businesses, it is appropriate for oil drilling giants, like BP, 
to pay for all harm resulting from their negligent conduct.95 This Article 
also addresses those oil-drilling corporations that have insufficient 
resources to cover the most extreme outcomes. Otherwise, the federal or 
state governments would become the general insurers for those firms 
least capable of handling these low-probability, high-loss situations.96 
Theoretically, legislative bodies are the preferred institution to initi-
ate reform of any area of the law…[m]oreover, legislatures can ac-
complish comprehensive reform through a single statutory enact-
ment; unfortunately, modern  legislatures have developed powerful 
inertial forces that render them impotent to make comprehensive 
changes in the law that will adversely affect vested interests.97  
 This Author, along with the countless other Louisiana residents who 
have been intimately or remotely affected by the spill, cannot be satisfied 
with a simple injunction or any kind of recovery that emanates from the 
current language found in Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code. An 
amendment to this article is necessary and imperative. Since absolute 
liability is a hybrid of both strict liability and negligence concepts, it is 
unreasonable for any civilian scholar or legislator to oppose the idea of 
encapsulating98 oil drilling as a third category of ultra-hazardous 
activity99 in Louisiana. Ultra-hazardous activity has been uniquely 
classified as those activities that are capable of causing injuries to others, 
even when conducted with the greatest degree of prudence and care.100 
The other factors engraved into our understanding of ultra-hazardous 
                                                 
95. See GULF COAST SENATORS, supra note 22, (declaring resources from the fishing, tourism, 
shipping, and energy exploration industries account for over $200 billion in economic activity each 
year). 
96. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 9, at 1721. 
97. See Richard Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 917 (1985); see 
also Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. 
L. REV. 1175, 1196-99 (1981). 
98. This Author recognizes that several courts across the country have rejected, over the years, 
the idea of expanding absolute liability to certain activities notwithstanding the dangers. See, e.g., 
Bosley v. Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 255 A.2d 671 (Vt. 1969) (declaring that Supreme Court of 
Vermont would not invoke the doctrine of absolute liability against a public service corporation due 
to electrical burns a young boy received when he came in contact with that corporation’s electrical 
wires). 
99. See Street v. Equitable Petroleum Corp., 532 So. 2d 887 (La. 1988) (applying the Butler v. 
Baber principle, stating that “667/2315” liability may be imposed without proof that an activity 
(storage/spillage of oil) is ultra-hazardous). 
100. See Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d 548, 549 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 
U.S. 1034 (1988); see also Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 766 F. 2d 904, 907 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
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activity are the extremely lucrative nature and catastrophic effects that 
can result from the activity.101 For BP, the economic incentives to drill 
resulted in risky behavior that devastated the Louisiana coastline. 
 In a case dealing with ultra-hazardous activity, Mossy Motors, Inc. 
v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans,102 a New Orleans car 
dealership filed suit against the Sewerage & Water Board of New 
Orleans (SWB), its contractor, and its engineer for structural damage and 
business-related interruption.103 The dealership sustained structural 
damage as a result of the demolition and replacement of an underground 
concrete structure that was adjacent to the dealership.104 SWB and its 
agents conducted deep well pumping or dewatering105 at this particular 
site, which not only caused the water table in the area to be lowered,106 
but also caused settlement or subsidence of the ground that compromised 
the structural integrity of the dealership’s buildings.107 To add validity to 
its argument, the dealership presented evidence reflecting that SWB 
could have used less dangerous measures to remove the contaminated 
soil108 near the dealership. However, the method of removal selected by 
the defendant agency was imprudent, impracticable, and dilatory.109 
 The similarities between the dewatering process in Mossy Motors 
and the oil drilling operations performed by BP at its Deepwater Horizon 
site in April 2010 are clear:  SWB was negligent (i.e. strictly liable),110 
or at fault, because it selected a process of sediment removal that it 
knew, or should have known, would damage nearby structures. Prior to 
its amendment in 1996, Article 667 would have held SWB accountable 
for the damage caused by the dewatering process, and the degree111 of 
                                                 
101. See Ainsworth, 829 F.2d at 549-50. 
102. See Mossy Motors, Inc., v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 98-0495 (La. App. 4 
Cir. 5/12/99); 753 So. 2d 269. 
103. Id. at 273. 
104. Id. 
105. Dewatering is a process involving the pumping out of underground water from a 





110. See Prentice L. White, When Theory Met Practice: Teaching Tort Law from a Practical 
Perspective, 10 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 311, 339 (2008) (stating that “a claim under 
strict liability, in its purest form, occurs when the defendant’s negligence is presumed because of his 
legal relationship to the [negligent person or the defective thing] that first caused the unreasonable 
risk of harm”). 
111. See Mossy Motors, 753 So. 2d at 276 (indicating that “the new definition by amendment 
defines ultrahazardous activity legislatively, but, under the pre-amendment law, it was an easy leap 
between pile-driving, explosives and dewatering). 
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care used by the landowner would not have exonerated112 it from civil 
liability.113 
 In Yokum v. 615 Bourbon Street, LLC,114 the Louisiana Supreme 
Court granted certiorari for the purpose of reversing115 the appellate 
court’s ruling that a commercial owner and lessor is not liable under 
Civil Code Article 667 for excessive noise associated with loud music 
played in the owner, or lessor’s, establishment. The appellate court 
determined that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently establish a cause of 
action against the named lessor (defendant) in this particular case. 
Plaintiffs complained that they had been subjected to loud and on-going 
live entertainment116 conducted at the bar that the defendant leased to 
another commercial entity. Plaintiffs sent letters to the establishment, 
hoping to resolve the issue without court intervention, but with no 
success. 
 The appellate court found that the defendant was not legally 
responsible for the excessive loud music coming from the commercial 
establishment because the lessor had leased the property to a third party, 
and it was the third party who caused the harm.117 More specifically, the 
appellate court found that the lease agreement between the defendant and 
his lessee mentioned that if the lessee used the property in any manner 
that would tend to injure, depreciate, or otherwise be classified as 
unlawful, the lease agreement would be considered breached and would 
exonerate the lessor from liability. The Louisiana Supreme Court 
discussed at length that the language of the relevant statute, La. Civil 
Code Art. 667, directs the restrictions and limitations on the right of use 
of immovable property that may deprive a neighbor of the liberty of 
using or enjoying his or her property.118 However, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court needed to reconcile whether these 
owners/proprietors/lessors can be held accountable for any use violations 
on their property by their lessees (natural or juridical) when the 
                                                 
112. See Mack E. Barham, The Viability of Comparative Negligence as a Defense to Strict 
Liability in Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1984) (declaring that “[i]in traditional common 
law jurisdictions, strict liability has generally been imposed when the activity giving rise to liability 
falls into the broad categories of either ultrahazardous activity or some type of product liability”). 
113. See Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905, 912 (La. 1973) 
(stating that under Article 667, the [Sewerage & Water Board] would be liable for damages to the 
plaintiff’s property caused by its construction activities, no matter how prudently they were done). 
114. See Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., LLC., 2007-1785 (La. 2/26/08); 977 So. 2d 859. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 862. 
117. Id. at 869. 
118. Id. at 872. 
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violations derive from the permission of these owners.119 In essence, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court correctly held that Article 667 permitted an 
expansion of liability on the proprietor or owner even in situations where 
the owner only indirectly contributed120 to his neighbor’s harm. 
Consequently, the Louisiana Supreme Court also opined that the term 
“work,” as used in the article, encompassed not only constructions made 
on the property, but also harmful and injurious activities held on the 
property when the landowner knew, or should have known, of the 
resulting injury or harm.121 
 Likewise, this Author asserts that the Louisiana Supreme Court 
should implement the same logic to expand the language of Article 667 
to include oil drilling activities because these activities can be 
injurious122 to adjacent neighbors/landowners and because including this 
third category of prohibited activities would not do an injustice to the 
overall scope of Article 667. As mentioned earlier, oil drilling is a 
hybrid123 of both blasting with explosives and pile driving, which the 
legislature has separately defined as potentially injurious activities and 
therefore when combined should also be classified as a potentially 
injurious activity.124 The rationale for this proposition might not be 
universal,125 as the rule of absolute liability126 has been contingent upon 
the locality of the incident or on the population of the area where the 
incident occurred. While enjoying and using one’s commercial or 
residential property is both necessary and essential to our state’s 
economy, it is also dangerous to assume that such a right should 
inherently be considered limitless. However, oil drilling is an activity 
that is dangerous127 and potentially destructive to the men and women 
                                                 
119. See Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243, 1251 (La. 1994) (citing Lombard v. 
Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905, 912 (La. 1973); Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort 
Doctrine in Louisiana: The Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 TUL. L. REV. 701, 711 (1966)). 
120. See Yokum, 977 So. 2d at 875. 
121. Id. 
122. See Chaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 181, 186 (La. 1971) (stating that “it is not 
the manner in which the activity is carried on which is significant; it is the fact that the activity 
causes damage to a neighbor which is relevant”). 
123. See Craig C. Freudenrich, How Oil Drilling Works, ENERGY CAPITAL GROUP, 
http://www.encapgroup.com/drilling/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (discussing how oil drilling works 
and how oil is extracted from the ocean floor). 
124. Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil Justice Reform and 
the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 339, 364 (1966) (criticizing the specific 
list of qualifying activities for absolute liability, commends the legislature for using language that 
would give it some flexibility to include new and unanticipated situations). 
125. See Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting—The 
Rule of the Future, 33 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1920). 
126. See 3 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE § 688 a (6th ed. 1913). 
127. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 9, at 1743 (indicating that BP filed several lawsuits 
against other corporations in an effort to recoup some of the money that it has had to pay to those 
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who work on these oil platforms and should be treated as such by the 
Louisiana legislature. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 In conclusion, oil drilling can harm marine life, people’s lives, and 
the state’s welfare, so the activity should not be beyond legislative 
redress. The proposed amendment is a simple, yet necessary, legislative 
measure that should be a part of our state’s ongoing128 human rights due 
diligence process.129 Undeniably, BP has to do more than mitigate the 
disastrous effects of the oil spill by offering support to Gulf Coast 
businesses. In fact, BP must fully compensate each and every resident 
who has a viable claim against it.130 Further, BP must extend its recovery 
efforts to the State of Louisiana in order to protect and shelter 
Louisiana’s wildlife and coastlines. 
 The ecological effects from the BP Oil Spill are still being 
examined131 and studied, but the mental and economic effects132 from 
this disaster are forever visible in the eyes of Louisiana’s citizens. It is in 
the eyes of the children who lost their parents on the Deep Water 
Horizon. It is in the eyes of the wives who are now widows. It is in the 
eyes of distraught family members who are still coping with the reality of 
a loved one committing suicide because of the unrecoverable loss of 
financial security. The duty to protect our citizens from harm not only 
lies on BP’s corporate133 doorstep, but it should also be found in the 
policies that are proposed, debated, and signed on the floor of our 
                                                                                                             
Gulf Coast residents who have been harmed in the oil spill. BP filed a tort claim against the 
manufacturer of the blowout preventer and it filed another suit against Halliburton for fraud and 
misconduct). 
128. See Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133, 1080 (La. 1971) (declaring that the 
“trend has been toward an expansion of the classes of those who are entitled to recovery as well as 
an expansion of the classes from whom recovery can be had”); see also Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. 
Ann. 227 (La. 1855); see also City of New Orleans v. Lambert, 14 La. Ann. 247 (La. 1859); see also 
Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627 (La. 1968). 
129. See generally Sherman, supra note 60. 
130. See GULF COAST SENATORS, supra note 22, (Senator Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) demanded 
that BP adhere to a ‘good neighbor’ policy, meaning that it should first look to utilize Gulf Coast 
residents and resources as it begins to heal these communities by using an extensive, multi-year 
ecological and economic recovery operation). 
131. See Brent K. Marshall, et al., Technological Disasters, Litigation Stress, and the Use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 26 LAW & POL’Y 289, 291 (2004) (emphasizing the 
fact that technological disasters produces an enduring pattern of economic, cultural, social and 
psychological harm). 
132. See Felicity Barringer, et al., Seeking Answers on Oil Spill as Questions Mount, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/26primerWEB.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0. 
133. See Nocera, supra note 61. 
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legislature.134 It has been argued that some legislatures are incapable of 
adjusting to the changing tide of our present society because state 
legislatures are faced with complicated and complex issues with 
insufficient expertise. It has also been stated that the government bodies 
have an inherent inability to foresee or to respond to problems that may 
arise in the future.135 Such explanations should not be lodged against the 
Louisiana legislature, as our state has become the nation’s spokesperson 
for disasters. 
 Trial courts should retain a reasonable amount of discretion when 
determining if an activity qualifies as ultrahazardous, but it is the 
legislature that has been vested with the authority to expand Article 667 
to include oil drilling as an activity that has the potential136 of causing an 
enormous risk of harm that is either temporal or generational.137 
                                                 
134. See Sherman, supra note 60, at 283 (articulating that the state’s duty to protect against 
third party abuse, including abuse from a corporate citizen or foreigner, is grounded in international 
human rights law; it is a standard of conduct, and while state are not held responsible for corporate-
related human rights abuses per se, said states may be considered as having breached their 
obligations where they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate and even punish those 
abuses when they occur). 
135. See Pierce, supra note 97, at 919; see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1695 (1975); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, 
A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 720 (1969). 
136. See generally Updike v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. La. 1992). 
137. See generally Maraist & Galligan, supra note 124. 
